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ABSTRACT
We  empirically  analyze  the  relationship  between  globalisation  and  poverty.
Deviating from the mainstream literature, we use ‘synthetic’ globalisation and
poverty indicators, which combine multiple single indicators into single-valued
statistics. Further, we study a sample that includes OECD countries as well as
non-OECD countries, which allows us to examine the effect of structural differ-
ences between countries (summarized in a OECD dummy). Our results reveal
no significant effect of globalisation on poverty when correcting for the OECD
effect. We argue that this suggests institutional quality as a more fundamental
determinant of a country’s poverty performance than the degree of integration
with the global economy. On the methodological level, our use of synthetic indi-
cators entails a parsimonious specification of the globalisation-poverty relation-
ship, which increases its transparency.
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The relationship between globalisation and poverty has become topi-
cal within the recent economic literature - as well as in the streets1.
Pitted against each other are on the one side those who presume that
globalisation can be a major weapon in the attack on poverty reduc-
tion and on the other side the skeptics who cannot exclude that glob-
alisation actually aggravates the poverty problem.
Both sides find support for their position in economic theory:
Arguments favoring globalisation as a means of poverty reduction
abound in basic economic theory. As far as trade is concerned, the
factor price equalization theorem (e.g., Samuelson (1948)) is in this
respect emblematic; it predicts that wages and interest rates will be
equalized between free-trading nations. International capital mobility
as implied by financial integration can but accelerate and deepen this
equalization. This optimism that originated in a static context carries
over to growth theory. International capital mobility will hasten the
transition to the steady state in a Solow growth model, so entailing
convergence  (e.g.,  Romer  (1996)  p.27).  In  models  of  endogenous
growth,  globalisation  contributes  to  growth  and  convergence  by
increasing the flow of ideas and of technological knowledge (e.g.,
Romer (1992)). Adding to all that the idea that growth is good for the
poor (e.g., Dollar and Kraay (2001)) and the upshot is that globalisa-
tion is a potent means of poverty reduction.
But economic theory can also be used by the other side of the
argument. It is generally admitted that opening an economy to trade
and  international  capital  flows  entails  adjustment  costs.  But  the
adverse impact of globalisation may well transcend such a short run
perspective. As  for  trade,  there  is  the  possibility  that  low  income
countries have an initial comparative advantage in sectors with low
growth  potential,  either  because  in  these  sectors  there  are  no
economies  of  scale  or  because  there  is  little  scope  for  technical
progress. If the opposite holds for developed countries, trade liberal-
ization will lead to international divergence (e.g., Matsuyama (1992)).
Inequality within developing countries will increase if trade deepens
the gap between the wages of the skilled and those of the unskilled
and if the underdevelopment of the national capital market prevents
unskilled workers from accumulating human capital (e.g., Beyer et
574al. (1999) and Galor and Zeira (1993)). Next, openness to capital
markets may generate adverse effects due to the asymmetric access
of  developing  countries  to  international  capital  markets:  in  good
times access is easy; in bad times there are credit constraints. Such
asymmetric  access  to  international  capital  markets  is  pro-cyclical,
increasing  volatility  of  interest  rates  and  dampening  growth  (e.g.,
Agenor (2001)). Finally, if foreign capital flows disproportionately to
skill  intensive  sectors,  the  wage  gap  between  the  skilled  and
unskilled workers will further increase (e.g., Agenor (2002)).
This theoretical discussion calls for empirical investigation, which
has indeed inspired a growing body of literature. Most studies within
that  literature  employ  GDP per  capita  (levels  or  changes)  as  the
dependent variable, hereby implicitly assuming that growth benefits
the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich2.  Evidently,  such  assumption  may  be
questioned by some. Therefore, other studies have focused on spe-
cific  distributional  aspects  to  capture  poverty  performance.  For
example, Agenor (2002) uses the poverty rate as the dependent vari-
able and Dollar and Kraay (2001) employ income inequality (such as
the GINI index) as the variable to be explained.
Our study fits within that empirical literature. The specific contri-
bution of the paper is two-fold:
1.On the empirical level, we consider a sample that includes high-
income countries, in addition to low-income and middle income
countries. This allows us to identify structural differences in the
relationship between globalisation and poverty according to the
country-type (specifically, OECD versus non-OECD)3.
2.On  the  methodological  level,  we  use  ‘aggregated’ or  ‘syn-
thetic’ measures for poverty and globalisation, whereas exist-
ing research relates single poverty indicators to single globali-
sation  indicators.  The  need  for  synthetic  indicators  appears
when  recognizing  that  the  perception  of  poverty  generally
refers not only to the poverty rate but also to other distribu-
tional  aspects  (e.g.,  the  GINI  index)4;  some  may  argue  that
(especially in a cross-country analysis) a poverty index should
also include GDP per capita. Similarly, globalisation refers to
integration with the global capital market as well as with the
world market for goods and services. Aggregating the different
dimensions into single-valued statistics has the advantage that
it allows for a parsimonious specification of the empirical link
575between globalisation and poverty, which may reveal a more
transparent ‘global picture’ of the relationship under study.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section
we  introduce  the  method  that  we  use  for  constructing  ‘synthetic’
globalisation and poverty indicators. As we will indicate, we use a
method that employs ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ weighting to merge the
different single indicators associated with poverty and globalisation.
Section  III  contains  our  empirical  application.  Finally,  section  IV
provides some concluding discussion.
II.SYNTHETIC INDICATORS
Consider the general case of m (globalisation/poverty) policy indica-
tors for n countries, and let yij be the value of indicator i in country j.
We want to merge these individual indicators into a single-valued
synthetic indicator, defined as the weighted average of the original
set of m single-dimensional indicators. The quality of this indicator
depends crucially on the weighting of the constituent single indica-
tors. If we interpret the synthetic indicators as policy indicators5, the
weights  associated  with  each  (poverty  or  globalisation)  dimension
should reflect the policy priority that is given to it. Clearly, it is diffi-
cult  to  specify  a  priori any  generally  acceptable  weights  to  be
accorded to each indicator. Therefore, we adopt a weighting proce-
dure that is based on the principle of ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’6. The spe-
cific procedure was originally proposed in the context of macroeco-
nomic  performance  evaluation  by  Melyn  and  Moesen  (1991);  see
also Cherchye (2001) for a methodological discussion. Since then,
similar  methods  have  been  applied  to  other  types  of  macro-level
assessments.  For  example,  Mahlberg  and  Obersteiner  (2001)  and
Cherchye  and  Kuosmanen  (2002)  adopted  benefit-of-the-doubt
weighting for cross-country assessments of human development and
sustainable development performance, and Storrie and Bjurek (2000)
analyze the labor market performance of EU countries; in a closely
related study Cherchye et al. (2003a,b) use the same method for mea-
suring performance of EU–countries in the combat against poverty
and social exclusion. We will explain the method in three steps: the
normalizing  of  the  single  indicators,  the  weighting  problem  and,
finally, the construction of a synthetic indicator.
576A. Normalizing single indicators
In a first step, the construction of a synthetic indicator involves nor-
malizing the original data, i.e. the country-specific values of the sin-
gle indicators. We note here that some indicators in our following
discussion can be considered as ‘bads’ (i.e. higher values represent
worse performance) while others can be considered as ‘goods’ (i.e.
higher values represent better performance). For example, within the
context of poverty-oriented policy evaluation, the poverty rate and
the GINI index can clearly be interpreted as bads, while the GDP per
capita acts as a good. Similarly, within the evaluation of globalisation
policy,  international  trade  in  goods  or  foreign  investment  can  be
interpreted  as  ‘goods’,  in  the  sense  that  higher  values  indicate  a
higher degree of integration with the global economy7.
To render goods and bads commensurable, we normalize the orig-
inal indicator values. We denote the normalized counterpart of each
yij by  . To simplify notation, we further use  to refer to the
lowest value for the i-th indicator over all countries in the sample,
and  to refer to the highest value. The normalization method
takes the difference between the single indicator value of country j
and the corresponding value of the worst-performing country, and
divides this difference by the observed sample range. Thus, when the
i-th indicator is a good, we have:
And alternatively, if the i-th indicator is a bad, we have:
In both cases, the values of the normalized indicators vary between 0
and 1, 0 always corresponding to the worst performance in the sam-
ple and 1 corresponding to the best performance.
B. The weighting problem
After normalization, the next step typically involves aggregation, per
country,  of  the  single-dimensional  performance  indices  into  a




























577the weights. Aggregation/weighting questions have been extensively
studied in the literature on productivity indices; see, e.g., Balk (2002)
for a discussion. The procedure for constructing synthetic indicators
discussed below is firmly rooted in that literature.
Normalized  indicators  can  in  principle  be  aggregated  in  several
ways. In the simplest case one uses predetermined weights associated
with each single indicator. For example, one can take the average of
the different single indicators, which implies equal weighting. How-
ever, as discussed above, we believe that the indicator weights should
be  sensitive  to  national  policy  priorities.  In  that  respect,  it  seems
hardly tenable that each country de facto assigns equal weights to the
different  policy  dimensions.  In  fact,  the  specification  of  a  priori
weights seems a very difficult task when differing policy priorities
prevail over countries.
By contrast, the procedure that we adopt reconstructs ‘implicit’ (or
‘shadow’) policy weights from the observed performance (i.e. a pos-
teriori).  More  specifically,  the  relative  weight  accorded  to  each
dimension is endogenously determined in the performance evaluation
model, and reflects the associated relative performance of the coun-
try under evaluation. Stated otherwise, good relative performance in
a particular dimension is seen as ‘revealed’ evidence of setting high
national policy priority to that dimension. This seems an attractive
second best route in the absence of full information about the true
policy priorities.
C. A graphical illustration
The weighting method that we use can be considered as a special
case  of  the  methodology  known  under  the  general  denomination
‘Data Envelopment Analysis’ (DEA; after Charnes et al. (1978)). As
DEA does not yet belong to the standard toolkit of the economist, we
first provide a brief graphical introduction; we present a more gen-
eral,  algebraic  treatment  in  the  next  subsection.  Specifically,  we
graphically illustrate the construction of our synthetic globalisation
indicator8.
DEA generally evaluates productive performance by relating the
inputs  that  are  used  to  the  outputs  that  are  produced.  Translated
towards the current setting, the outputs are (normalized data on) for-
eign trade and foreign direct investment (see Section III for definitions
and discussion of the globalisation indicators that we use); the input
578is supposed to be the same for each country. In fact, our assumption
that each country uses the same input boils down to assuming that
each country faces the same (input) policy constraints9. Admittedly,
this  supposition  is  rather  heroic,  but  it  conveniently  allows  us  to
graphically summarize the country data as in Figure 1.
In that figure, each point represents a country. To focus our fol-
lowing discussion, we restrict attention to Belgium (B), Guyana (G)
and Denmark (D). We are specifically interested in comparing the
overall ‘globalisation’ performance of these three countries. Gener-
ally, relative performance is evaluated with respect to some ‘bench-
mark’ performance. Obviously, different methods can be employed
for identifying such benchmark transformation of input into output
(from a sample of observations). For example, one could average out
the best and the worst performances, which is typical practice in the
more conventional parametric approaches. Underlying such approach
is the assumption that all countries are equally efficient; within that
perspective, deviations from the fitted line are somehow accidental
and, consequently, should not be taken seriously. The DEA approach
that we adopt in this paper takes a completely different stance. It
identifies the benchmark transformation curve as the ‘envelope’ of
the data, as shown in Figure 2. In this kind of analysis, extreme data
are no longer considered as aberrations; they actually figure as the
benchmarks for the other countries (that lie within the data envelope).
A result is that only observed best practices are considered as (rela-
tively) efficient; the performance of other (inefficient) countries is
measured relative to the performance of these benchmark countries.
From Figure 2, we identify Guyana (G) and Belgium (B) as the
benchmark countries in our sample; they get a synthetic indicator
value of unity (100%). All other countries obtain a lower globalisa-
tion performance value (between 0% and 100%; higher values indi-
cate a higher degree of globalisation). Graphically, the synthetic indi-
cator value for a particular country is calculated as the ratio of the
distance of that country point from the origin over the distance from
the origin to the nearest point on the data envelope. For example,
Denmark (D) obtains a performance score of OD/OF, which amounts
to slightly more than 50 %. In other words, using the same input
(which is assumed to be identical for all countries; see above) Bel-
gium and Guyana achieve almost double the output of Denmark; this
can be interpreted as evidence for a less globalisation-oriented policy
in Denmark vis-à-vis Belgium and Guyana.
579In  terms  of  the  revealed  policy  weighting  discussed  above,
Denmark’s synthetic indicator value is obtained as the ratio of the
weighted output sum of Denmark over that associated with Belgium
and/or Guyana, where the weights of the two outputs (foreign trade
and foreign direct investment) are selected as most favorable from
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FIGURE 1
Foreign trade and foreign direct investment (normalized values); scatter plot
FIGURE 2
The data envelope and a relative performance indicatorthe  Danish  point  of  view  (i.e.,  they  maximize  the  ratio  of  the
weighted output sums). Indeed, it is quite easy to check that taking
for example equal weights for the two outputs obtains a score for
Denmark that is less than 50 % of the Guyana score (which corre-
sponds to the highest sum of equally weighted outputs). Assessing
the relative performance of a country in terms of the best possible
weights for that country captures the very essence of the benefit of
the doubt weighting procedure that we employ. We next explain alge-
braically how these weights are determined in practical applications.
D. A formal presentation
Generally, we can define a synthetic policy indicator as the ratio of a
country’s  actual  performance  over  its  ‘benchmark  performance’,
where performance is measured as a weighted sum of the single indi-
cator values. Benchmark performance is represented by the (normal-
ized) benchmark vector  of indicator values. Using 
to  represent  the  weight  accorded  to  each  indicator  i and
to indicate benchmark performance
in each policy dimension i, we get for each country  :
Two questions remain in making this relative performance measure
operational: (1) we need to define benchmark performance, and (2)
we need to specify the relative weights accorded to the different pol-
icy dimensions.
The first question is easy to solve. We identify best practice from
observed performance; we simply select the country which maximizes
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581Note that, since the weights are country-specific, nothing precludes
that each country is compared with its proper best practice; other
countries can be associated with different benchmark observations.
The solution to the second question has been informally introduced
above: we select the weights that maximize the resulting performance
values for the country (j) under evaluation. At this stage, we only
impose that the weights cannot be negative, i.e., that the synthetic
value is a non-decreasing function of the individual indicators. This
gives the following performance measure for each country j (where
SI stands for ‘Synthetic Indicator’):
(1)
Clearly, as  for each weighting scheme wi
, we have  ; and higher indicator values can be
interpreted as better overall performance. The generosity of the method
is  immediate:  the  weights  are  chosen  in  such  a  way  that  no  other
weight combination would yield a higher relative performance value
for  country  j.  And  if  ,  there  are  other  countries  k ∈
{1,..,n} \ {j} in the rest of the sample that would obtain a higher over-
all indicator value, even when using country j’s most favorable weights.
The synthetic indicator can also be expressed in a linear program-
ming form. To see this, note that only relative weights matter; multi-
plying all weights  by a common factor will not alter
the indicator value. We can consequently normalize the weights so
that  , and thus re-express (1) as:
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582Hence,  standard  linear  programming  suffices  to  compute  the
aggregated indicator value, which is evidently an appealing feature
for practical applications.
Finally, the model is readily complemented with additional weight
restrictions. For example, in our empirical application we will use the
following restriction:
(3)
This restriction imposes that any policy dimension that is consid-
ered in the model should get an (implicit policy) weight of at least
20% in the synthetic indicator value. In our empirical application we
consider  synthetic  indicators  that  are  computed  with  and  without
restriction (3). We will compare the associated results with those for
equally weighted synthetic indicators, which are constructed as the
arithmetic average of the normalized indicator values (see above).
III.EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
A. Single and synthetic indicators
We consider a sample of 61 countries, which consists of 20 OECD
countries and 41 non-OECD countries; see Table A1 in the appen-
dix10. The data for our empirical analysis are taken from the “World
Development  Indicators”  of  the  World  Bank  (2003).  We  consider
three single poverty indicators11:
1.GINI  index:  the  extent  to  which  the  distribution  of  income
among  individuals  or  households  deviates  from  a  perfectly
equal distribution;
2.Poverty rate: the percentage of people living below the national
poverty line;
3.GDP per capita: the gross domestic product divided by midyear
population, converted to 1995 US$ using purchasing power par-
ity rates.
The GINI index and the poverty rate are frequently used indica-
tors to evaluate the “fairness” of the income distribution of a coun-
















583for purchasing power differences) as it may indeed be argued that
one country outperforms another in terms of poverty if it achieves a
higher  average  income,  even  if  both  countries  attain  the  same
poverty  rate  and  GINI  index  values.  For  brevity,  we  summarize
these three dimensions under the header ‘poverty’ in our following
discussion12. To check for the sensitivity of our findings with respect
to incorporating the GDP per capita ratio, we consider two synthetic
poverty  indicators:  an  indicator  that  includes  GDP per  capita
(labeled as ‘Pov1-SI’) and one that does not include GDP per capita
(labeled as ‘Pov2-SI’).
Further, we select two globalisation indicators:
1.Trade in goods (as a percentage of goods GDP) 13: the sum of
merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP
after subtracting value added in services;
2.Gross foreign direct investment (as a percentage of GDP): the
sum  of  the  absolute  inflows  and  outflows  of  foreign  direct
investment in the balance of payment financial account divided
by the value of GDP.
These indicators refer to the two essential dimensions of interna-
tional integration: foreign trade and international factor movements.
The synthetic globalisation indicator (labeled as ‘Glob-SI’) merges
these two dimensions into a single-valued statistic, which indicates
the overall degree of integration with the global economy. Attrac-
tively, this indicator represents the degree of globalisation as a con-
tinuous variable. This contrasts with the binomial approach adopted
by Dollar and Kraay (2001), who subdivide their country sample in
so-called ‘globalizers’ and ‘non-globalizers’.
Our empirical application uses average values for each of these
single indicators over the 10 years period 1992-2001. A summary of
the indicator values is given in Table 1. We observe –not very sur-
prisingly- a clear distinction between OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries: the former group of countries is generally associated with a
high level of globalisation (i.e., a high proportion of trade in goods
and foreign direct investment) and a low level of poverty (i.e., a
low  GINI  index,  a  low  poverty  rate  and  a  high  GDP per  capita
ratio), while the latter group generally combines a relatively low
level of international integration with a higher degree of poverty.
This may be interpreted as suggesting that globalisation enhances
584poverty performance; integration in the world economy apparently
helps in abating poverty. Still, it may also indicate a structural dif-
ference between OECD and non-OECD countries. In that perspec-
tive, OECD countries are situated in a so-called ‘high-level equilib-
rium’,  which  is  generally  characterized  by  good  poverty
performance  and  a  high  degree  of  international  integration;  in  a
similar vein, non-OECD countries are in a ‘low-level equilibrium’




Single indicators; summary statistics
GINI Poverty GDP per capita Trade in goods Gross foreign direct
index (constant 1995 US$) (% of goods GDP) investment
(% of GDP)
All
Average 40.038 27.621 8756.542 121.595 4.433
st. dev. 9.507 19.416 13030.184 61.375 4.103
min. 24.440 2.100 157.871 37.867 0.000
max. 60.320 86.000 44809.905 352.643 21.694
OECD
Average 31.567 9.840 24302.542 144.798 6.582
St. dev. 7.002 3.514 12423.420 72.385 4.222
min. 24.440 2.100 3118.319 46.543 0.623
max. 51.860 16.900 44809.905 352.643 14.029
Non-
OECD
Average 44.171 36.295 1173.127 110.276 3.385
st. dev. 7.674 18.011 1257.568 52.545 3.654
min. 30.330 4.600 157.871 37.867 0.000
max. 60.320 86.000 4781.379 285.074 21.694
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the synthetic indicators
Pov1-SI,  Pov2-SI  and  Glob-SI.  (The  corresponding  country-spe-
cific indicator values are tabulated in Table A1 in the Appendix.) As
indicated in Section II, we compute for each synthetic indicator a
version based on equal weighting (see ‘EW’ in Table 2), a version
that lets the (endogenously defined) policy weights completely free
(i.e., that imposes no weight restrictions; see ‘No WR’ in Table 2)
and a version that imposes a minimal weight of 20% for each pol-
icy dimension that is captured (see ‘WR’ in Table 2). As can beexpected, we observe the same pattern as in Table 1: OECD coun-
tries attain generally higher poverty performance (recall that higher
Pov1-SI and Pov2-SI values reveal a better poverty record) and are
characterized by a higher degree of integration with the world econ-
omy than non-OECD countries. This overall picture is not sensitive
to including GDP per capita in the synthetic poverty index (com-
pare the Pov1-SI and Pov2-SI results) or the weighting scheme that
is employed (compare the EW, No WR and WR results for the dif-
ferent  synthetic  indicators).  Further,  it  is  worth  to  point  out  the
intermediate position of the WR version of the different synthetic
indicators: the associated average values always lie between those
of the EW and No WR versions. In fact, this intermediate position
has conceptual appeal: it seems hardly reasonable that every policy
dimension gets the same policy weight in practice (as in the EW
version),  but  it  seems  equally  unlikely  that  all  weight  in  the
poverty/globalisation policy process is accorded to a single dimen-
sion (a scenario that is not excluded a priori in the No WR ver-
sion).
Two final notes pertain to our particular use of synthetic indicators.
First,  it  is  clear  that  such  practice  is  all  the  more  useful  in  cases
where the correlation between the different constituent single indica-
tors is not too strong; if these indicators were perfectly correlated,
there would be no information loss from restricting the analysis to a
sole indicator. In our particular application the correlation between
the different single indicators (of poverty and globalisation) is far
from  perfect:  it  lies  everywhere  between  54.713%  and  (minus)
57.574% (see Table A2 in the Appendix). This suggests value-added
from the use of synthetic indicators. Second, it is evident that syn-
thetic indicators are all the more valuable if they adequately reflect
the  information  in  each  of  the  single  indicators  that  are  included
(given  that  the  correlation  between  the  single  indicators  is  rather
weak); the indicator preferably gives a ‘balanced’ indication of the
‘aggregate’ performance  in  the  different  dimensions  that  are  cap-
tured. We can check this informational criterion by looking at the
correlation between each synthetic indicator and its single indicator
components. Again, such correlation check favors our focus on syn-
thetic indicators: the corresponding correlation coefficients lie every-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%A. Raw correlation analysis
We next study the relationship between poverty and globalisation in
greater  detail.  As  a  first  exploration,  we  consider  the  correlation
between our synthetic poverty indicators and our globalisation indi-
cators. For the sake of brevity, we concentrate our empirical analysis
on the poverty indicator that does not include the GDP per capita
ratio (i.e., Pov1-SI) and that imposes every poverty dimension to get
a weight of at least 20% in the main text (i.e., the WR version); as
discussed above, that version takes an intermediate position between
the EW and No WR indicator. Similarly, we select the WR version of
Glob-SI14.
Figure 1 gives the scatter plot and the associated correlation coef-
ficient  for  the  full  sample.  This  suggests  a  positive  relationship
between globalisation and poverty: integrating with the global econ-
omy seems to reduce poverty rather than to augment it. This is evi-
denced by a clear positive inclination of the linear fit of the data, and
a fairly high correlation coefficient (which amounts to 36.644%).
Still, our discussion of Tables 1 and 2 suggested a structural differ-
ence between OECD and non-OECD countries. This in turn pleads
for considering the OECD and non-OECD subsamples separately. If
the relationship between globalisation and poverty is genuinely posi-
tive, it should also be confirmed at the level of these structurally dif-
ferent subsamples. The corresponding scatter plots and correlation
coefficients are given in Figures 2 and 3. Although we again find that
integration with the global economy does not seem to aggravate the
poverty problem, these figures reveal a much less clear picture con-
cerning any positive relationship between globalisation and poverty
performance: the positive slope coefficient of the linear fit is much
smaller. Also,  while  the  correlation  stays  relatively  strong  for  the
OECD subsample (which suggests a fairly good fit in that case), it
becomes much less pronounced for the non-OECD subsample.
These  findings  lead  us  to  the  following  ‘interim’ conclusions.
When taking OECD and non-OECD countries together, globalisation
seems to reduce poverty. However, this argument weakens consider-
ably when correcting for the (structural) difference between OECD
and non-OECD countries. Of course, these conclusions are very pre-
liminary, since they merely build on raw correlations. It calls for a
more profound examination; we next investigate the same issues by
means of regression analysis.
588589
FIGURE 3
Globalisation and poverty; scatter plot; all countries (Poverty1; WR results)
FIGURE 4
Globalisation and poverty; scatter plot; OECD countries (Poverty1; WR results)
FIGURE 5
Globalisation and poverty; scatter plot; non-OECD countries (Poverty1; WR results)B. Regression analysis
We start our regression analysis by considering the overall relation-
ship between globalisation and poverty, which corresponds to Figure
1 above. The results, given in Table 3, confirm our earlier conclusion:
for the full sample of 61 (OECD and non-OECD countries) we find
a significantly positive relationship between poverty and globalisa-
tion; this finding is robust with respect to including GDP per capita
in the synthetic poverty indicator (compare the Pov1-SI estimation
with the Pov2-SI estimation).
This  may  entail  the  conclusion  that  globalisation  efforts  benefit
poverty performance rather than worsen it. Still, the apparent structural
difference between OECD and non-OECD countries (discussed above)
suggests conducting a similar regression exercise for the two subsam-
ples separately. Again, these findings confirm our earlier conjecture;
see Table 3. For non-OECD countries the case for integrating with the
world economy as a poverty-reducing strategy is no longer supported
empirically (for the Pov1-SI and Pov2-SI estimation results). For com-
pleteness, we should add that the argument that such integration aggra-
vates poverty is also rejected empirically: the (non-significant) slope
coefficient is positive. For the OECD subsample, the results are fairly
similar: although the positive slope coefficient is slightly more signifi-
cant (although it remains insignificant even in two-sided 10% tests),
the estimated coefficient value is much lower in absolute terms than for
the regressions where all countries are simultaneously considered (for
both Pov1-SI and Pov2-SI as the dependent variable).
When comparing the OECD and non-OECD estimation results, we
find that they differ primarily in terms of the intercept term (0.857
versus 0.562 for Pov1-SI; 0.852 versus 0.464 for Pov2-SI), while the
slope  coefficients  are  practically  the  same  (0.125  versus  0.141  for
Pov1-SI;  0.139  versus  0.151  for  Pov2-SI).  This  suggests  a  final
regression exercise that uses all country observations and that includes
an OECD dummy in addition to Glob-SI. These results reveal the fol-
lowing picture (for Pov1-SI as well as Pov2-SI): the slope coefficient
for the globalisation measure is positive but hardly significant (e.g., it
does not pass a two-sided 10% test); by contrast, the coefficient of the
OECD dummy is significantly positive at any reasonable significance
level. Further, the R2 values (0.519 for Pov1-SI; 0.667 for Pov23-SI)
show the adequacy of this specification; it explains a great deal of the
variation in the observed poverty performances15.
590We can draw the following general conclusions from our empirical
examination.  First,  globalisation  does  not  appear  to  affect  poverty
(neither negatively, nor positively). By contrast, structural features of
an economy seem to do a better job in explaining poverty. See in this
respect our results for the OECD dummy, which we can interpret as
a rough overall proxy for structural differences between countries.
C. If it is not globalisation, is it institutions ?
A natural next question pertains to the identification of the structural
features  that  benefit  poverty  performance.  Referring  to  our  earlier
terminology, which country characteristics make that OECD coun-
tries are situated in a ‘high-level equilibrium’ and non-OECD in a
‘low-level  equilibrium’?  A full  treatment  of  such  question  falls
beyond the scope of the current study. Still, some preliminary results
(discussed  below)  indicate  an  important  role  for  the  quality  of  a
country’s  institutional  environment.  We  follow  Kasper  and  Streit
(1998)  in  defining  institutions  as  “rules  of  human  interaction  that





All (1)OECD Non- All (2) All (1)OECD Non- All (2)
OECD OECD
Constant
coefficient 0.590 0.857 0.562 0.564 0.498 0.825 0.464 0.465
(0.044) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034) (0.047) (0.040) 0.041 (0.030)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Glob-SI
coefficient 0.348 0.125 0.141 0.134 0.409 0.139 0.151 0.145
(0.115) (0.070) (0.145) (0.092) (0.122) (0.083) (0.125) (0.082)





R2 0.134 0.151 0.024 0.519 0.161 0.135 0.036 0.667
adjusted R2 0.120 0.104 -0.001 0.503 0.147 0.087 0.011 0.655
# observations 61 20 41 61 61 20 41 61
Notes: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are between brackets; “p-value” stands for the
probability that the coefficient equals zero under normality.Stressing institutions as determinants of poverty performance falls in
line with a growing body of literature that suggests institutional dif-
ferences as a chief determinant of economic prosperity. See, among
many  others,  Mauro  (1995),  Knack  and  Keefer  ((1995),  (1997)),
Easterly and Levine (1997), Moesen (1998), Hall and Jones (1999),
Knack and Zak (2001) and Olsson and Hibbs (2002).
We  investigate  structural  differences  between  OECD  and  non-
OECD countries by correlating the OECD dummy to a number of
institutional indicators taken from Easterly and Levine (1997)16. A
selection of correlation results is reported in Table 4. These results
generally suggest important institutional differences between OECD
and  non-OECD  countries:  OECD-countries  are  characterized  by
higher-quality  government  (see  ‘Black  market  premium’,  ‘Demo-
cracy’ and ‘Rule of law’), a better educational system (see ‘Educa-
tion’) and a more favorable physical infrastructure (see ‘Telephones
per worker’ and ‘Paved roads’). These differences in the institutional
environment between OECD and non-OECD countries become even
more apparent when relating the OECD dummy to a synthetic indi-
cator of the ‘institutional infrastructure’; the associated correlation
coefficient amounts to no less than 93.548%17.
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TABLE 4
OECD dummy; correlation with institutional indicators
correlation with number of
OECD dummy observations
Black market premium -71.832% 32
Democracy 73.834% 31
Education 79.414% 28
Telephones per worker 91.840% 31
Paved roads 80.350% 30
Rule of law 90.343% 30
synthetic; equal weights 93.548% 32
These results suggest that the essential difference between OECD
and non-OECD countries boils down to institutional features. The
combination of this finding with our above conclusion (that not so
much  the  degree  of  globalisation  but  mainly  the  OECD  dummy
explains observed differences in poverty performance), indicates the
introduction of high-quality institutions as a far more successful rem-
edy for the poverty problem than integrating with the global econ-omy. Of course, this issue should be studied in greater detail in order
to enable more robust statements. (For example, one can argue that
international integration benefits the institutional quality and so indi-
rectly poverty; still, the least we can infer from our results is that this
globalisation channel is not the sole determinant of institutional qual-
ity; in fact, the relationship between institutional quality and globali-
sation seems rather weak18.) But the results in Table 4 do suggest this
as a potentially fruitful research avenue within the search for effec-
tive policy prescriptions in the battle against poverty.
IV.CONCLUSION
We have empirically analyzed the relationship between globalisation
and poverty. Our analysis uses synthetic ‘policy’ indicators, where
the  different  (poverty  and  globalisation)  policy  dimensions  are
merged on the basis of a method that extracts ‘revealed’ policy prior-
ities  from  the  actual  policy  results.  Our  cross-country  regression
employs  a  sample  that  includes  OECD  and  non-OECD  countries.
This  allows  us  to  investigate  the  residual  ‘globalisation  effect’ on
poverty after controlling for structural differences between countries
(summarized in a OECD dummy). Our main findings are the follow-
ing:
We observe that the apparent globalisation effect vanishes when
correcting  for  the  structural  differences  between  OECD  and  non-
OECD countries. This result suggests that, from the poverty point of
view, the current topical nature of the globalisation issue is ill-justi-
fied; there may well be no direct relationship at all between poverty
performance and the degree of integration with the global economy.
By contrast, our results do suggest the quality of the institutional
environment as a far more influential determinant of poverty perfor-
mance. Specifically, it appears that structural differences between
OECD and non-OECD countries, which explain an important part
of the variation in poverty performance, mainly boil down to insti-
tutional differences. In a way, this moves away the debate on glob-
alisation and poverty from ideology to measurable indicators of pol-
icy  performance  and  governance.  Further,  some  may  argue  that
‘openness to trade’ (see our globalisation measure) can in fact be
considered  as  an  institutional  feature.  From  that  perspective,  our
results should be interpreted as revealing it as less important than
593other  features  (e.g.,  related  to  government  quality,  education  and
physical infrastructure).
On the methodological level, our empirical exercise shows that the
use of synthetic policy indicators, which entails a parsimonious spec-
ification  of  the  relationship  between  globalisation  and  poverty,
allows for identifying a clear overall picture of the relationship under
study. Such overall picture is easy to communicate and easy to visu-
alize19.
In sum, this study primarily provides a ‘helicopter’ view on the
relationship between poverty on the one hand and globalisation and
institutions on the other. Our results suggest a main focus on institu-
tional quality as a probably fruitful policy avenue. Still, our results
should be interpreted with sufficient caution; the following limita-
tions of the current study should be taken into account:
The robustness of our results can be more profoundly investigated.
For example, limited data availability made us focus on a cross-sec-
tion analysis of 61 countries; it seems interesting to extend the analy-
sis for a panel data sample, possibly including a larger number of
countries. Also, greater data availability can allow for looking at the
same relationship for other (and possibly better) poverty and globali-
sation indicators.
A second line for further research pertains to the identified signifi-
cant relationship between poverty and institutional quality. Given our
prime focus on the link between poverty and globalisation, we have
not scrutinized this relationship in much detail; our results should be
interpreted as ‘orientating’ rather than ‘conclusive’. Further examin-
ing the specificity of the institutional channel is likely to be a reward-
ing avenue. For example, it may be interesting to investigate which
type of institutions feature as the ‘deepest’ determinants of poverty
performance. In this respect, it also looks obvious that the ‘optimal’
institutional configuration will be specific to each country. It can be
dangerous to infer country-specific conclusions from cross-country
regression results; the country-type should be taken into considera-
tion  when  formulating  possibly  far-reaching  policy  prescriptions
(compare with Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000); see Note 3).
Further, we have ignored possible effects of reverse causation in
our analysis. Still, it may well be argued that causality goes in the
two  directions:  the  degree  of  globalisation  or  institutional  quality
may impact poverty performance, but poverty performance may also
be expected to affect respectively the degree of global integration or
594institutional quality. At least, our results suggest a stronger correla-
tion between poverty and the institutional environment than between
poverty  and  globalisation  policies  (where  we  cannot  reject  the
hypothesis that there is no relationship at all). The specific study of
the direction of the institutions-poverty relationship may constitute a
fruitful avenue for future work.
Finally, it can be argued that globalisation benefits the quality of
institutions (e.g., through an increased degree of international com-
petition) and so indirectly affects the poverty performance. At least
our results suggest that globalisation is not the sole determinant of
the institutional quality; in fact, the relationship between institutional
quality  and  the  degree  of  integration  with  the  global  economy
appears to be rather weak. We note that this observation falls in line
with argument of Rodrik et al. (2002) and Rodrik and Subramanian
(2003), which claim the primacy of institutions. But, again, a full
treatment of this question falls beyond the scope of the current study.
It  may,  however,  constitute  a  worthwhile  starting  point  for  future
work.
NOTES
1.See Fisher (2003) for quantitative evidence on the exponentially increasing impor-
tance of the globalisation theme (e.g., in newspapers and on the internet).
2. See, e.g., Frankel and Romer (1999); Baldwin (2002) provides a survey of the
empirical literature.
3.We note that such exercise falls in line with Rodriguez and Rodrik’s (2000) sugges-
tion to look for contingent relationships in cross-national work.
4.Simultaneous consideration of an absolute poverty indicator and an income inequal-
ity indicator avoids the pitfall of selecting that indicator that best fits the ideological
preferences; compare with Ravallion (2003). Indeed, it has been observed that the
poverty headcount has been a favorite among globalisation optimists while globalisa-
tion pessimists seem to prefer Gini-coefficients.
5.It will be clear from our further exposition that we evaluate globalisation policy by
outcomes and not in terms of the policy measures that generate these outcomes (e.g.,
the institution of trade tariffs is a policy measure that is frequently considered in the
globalisation literature). We are well aware that outcomes reflect constraints as well
as preferences (and thus policies). In identifying outcomes with policies, we implic-
itly assume that the constraints are the same for the sample countries. Under that
assumption, differences in outcomes reveal differences in preferences; this actually
expresses the very idea behind the “benefit of the doubt” weighting procedure that we
employ (cf. infra). While this practice may entail interpretation problems at the level
of individual countries, we can reasonably expect that this intuitive ‘short route’gives
reliable ‘average’ results; this justifies our focus on central tendencies in our empiri-
cal application in section III. Evidently, an interesting avenue for further research
consists in unveiling the specific relationship between policies and outcomes, espe-
cially when the core focus were on the policy performance of individual countries.
5956.This section is adapted from Cherchye et al.  ((2000); section II), where the same pro-
cedure is proposed for constructing synthetic indicators of social inclusion perfor-
mance. We refer to that study for an in-depth discussion of the method (including dif-
ferent refinements).
7.The globalisation ‘performance’indicators measure the degree of integration with the
global economy; they reflect the position that policies that stimulate international
integration are ‘good’. Evidently, this should be distinguished from the interpretation
of such policies as ‘good’ in the sense that they effectively reduce poverty, which
forms the subject of our empirical analysis.
8.Note that we also use weight restrictions in the practical computation of our synthetic
globalisation and poverty indicators (see also our formal treatment in the next sub-
section). To keep the exposition simple, we abstract from such restrictions in this
introductory illustration.
9.Compare with Note 5.
10.Our sample of countries is determined by the criterion that consistent (poverty and
globalisation) data were available for at least one year in the period that we consider
(1992-2001).
11.The World Bank (2003) provides poverty rates for a limited number of countries.  We
have replaced the missing data with poverty rates reported in the “Human Develop-
ment Report” of the United Nations Development Program (2002).
12.It should be noted that this synthetic poverty indicator is specifically based on the
distribution of incomes. This contrasts with the UNDP Human Development Index
(HDI) which includes indicators of average income, health and education attain-
ment. Given the specific focus of our study, we think that the use of distributional
indicators is well-justified; this is conventional practice in the literature. But, evi-
dently, it could be interesting to compare our results with those obtained for a sim-
ilar regression exercise based on the HDI; this may constitute a rewarding research
avenue.
13.Our trade indicator does not correct for country size, which would have been desir-
able if trade as a proportion of GDP depended significantly on country size. We
checked this latter relationship by successively correlating our trade indicator on two
country size measures (viz., GDP in current US dollars (corrected for purchasing
power) and population, both series averaged over the 1992-2001 period). The corre-
lation coefficients were indeed negative but did not exceed 23%, which made us
decide  to  stick  to  the  uncorrected  indicator.  Further,  lack  of  data  prevents  us  to
explicitly consider integration with the world market for services in our empirical
analysis; we implicitly assume that such integration is (roughly) proportional to the
integration with the global market for goods.
14.Table A4 in the Appendix contains the pairwise correlation results for all synthetic
performance measures. That table reveals a grossly similar pattern for every pair of
indicators. Also, it shows a very strong correlation between the different versions of
Pov1-SI, Pov2-SI and Glob-SI, which suggests that our main findings are robust with
respect to the specific weight restriction that is employed (see (3) in section II).
15.We  note  that  this  R 2 value  is  higher  than  for  similarly  specified  single  indicator
regressions. For example, using the GINI index or the poverty rate as the dependent
variable (with Glob-SI and the OECD dummy as independent variables) gives an R2
of respectively 0.395 and 0.451 (versus 0.519 for the corresponding synthetic index
Pov1-SI). Similarly, using trade in goods and gross foreign investments as separate
independent  variables  (instead  of  Glob-SI)  does  not  yield  higher  R2 values  and
reveals even lower significance for the globalisation effects (both for Pov1-SI and
Pov2-SI as the dependent variables). In our opinion, these results favor our option to
use synthetic indicators for investigating the relationship between globalisation and
poverty.
59616.See  http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddeale.htm for  sources  and  defini-
tions. In Table 4, ‘Black market premium’, ‘Democracy’, Education’, ‘Telephones
per  worker’,  ‘Paved  roads’ and  ‘Rule  of  law’ relate  respectively  to  Easterly  and
Levine’s  (1997)  ‘BLCK’,  ‘DEMOC’,  ‘LSCHOOL’,  ‘LTELPW’,  ‘PAVROAD’ and
‘RULELAW’. We do not have matching institutional data for all 61 countries in our
sample; the number of observations that can be used for each correlation coefficient
is given in Table 4. Further, we use the data that pertain to the decade 1980-1989; we
can reasonably expect the correlations to be stronger than those tabulated in Table 4
for similarly constructed institutional indicators that pertain to the 10 years period
1992-2001, provided those were available.
17.We use an equal weighting procedure for constructing the synthetic institutional indi-
cator because we are confronted with missing data for a number of single indicators.
In the cases where no country data are available for some institutional indicator(s),
we compute the synthetic indicator by taking the arithmetic average of those normal-
ized single indicators (constructed by using the normalization procedure in section II)
for which data are available for the evaluated country.
18.This argument is further supported by computing the correlation between the OECD
dummy (as a rough indicator for the institutional quality; see the results in Table 4)
and our globalisation indicators. For example, the corresponding correlation coeffi-
cients for the WR version of Glob-SI amounts to only 34.178%; the respective coef-
ficients  for  our  trade  in  goods  and  gross  foreign  direct  investment  indicators  are
26.241% and 36.879%.
19.See also Note 15, where we compare the ‘synthetic’ results with those based on sin-
gle-dimensional poverty and globalisation indicators.
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